Genetic Duplication for Eternal Life
The concept of transferring consciousness to clones, robots, or simulations as a means to achieve immortality has sparked intense debate among scientists, philosophers, and the general public. This article explores the philosophical and scientific arguments against using cloning for achieving immortality, particularly when compared to the concept of teleportation or mind uploading.
Philosophical Arguments
Cloning, despite creating a genetically identical copy of a person, does not guarantee the continuation of the original individual's subjective experience and consciousness. The clone, despite sharing identical DNA, is a separate entity that begins life at the time of cloning. Thus, the original person's continuity of consciousness is not maintained, and immortality is not achieved for the original self, but rather for a new distinct clone.
Teleportation and mind uploading also raise questions about personal identity. Philosopher Massimo Pigliucci argues that mind uploading is a form of "technologically sophisticated suicide" because it does not preserve personal identity—the resulting consciousness would be a copy, not a continuation of the original self. Transhumanist philosopher Mary Midgley critiques the transhumanist quest for immortality (including cloning and digital mind transfer) as rooted in "quasi-scientific dreams" driven by fear of death rather than sound science or realistic ethics.
Scientific Arguments
Cloning replicates genetic information but does not recreate memories, personality, or consciousness of the original individual. The process produces a new biological organism that must develop independently, meaning the original self does not continue in the clone. Scientific skepticism also surrounds mind uploading, as there is no current evidence that consciousness or subjective experience can be preserved or transferred digitally.
Comparison with Teleportation
Both cloning and teleportation pose the problem of identity. In cloning, the original person remains, and the clone is a new separate individual with identical genetics. In teleportation (especially theoretical versions involving brain scanning and reconstruction), the original is destroyed at the start and re-created elsewhere, raising the question of whether the "copy" is truly the same person.
Implications and Ethical Concerns
The debate on the ethics and implications of cloning for immortality is ongoing. Some believe that cloning could be a means to preserve certain individuals, such as geniuses like Einstein and Hawking. However, in a worst-case scenario, the original person may be discarded once the clone is ready. The ongoing debate also includes questions about the value of leaving something behind, even if the original person is no longer present.
The concept of having a part of oneself live on beyond death, through clones or other means, is a topic of discussion. If consciousness transfer is achieved, it may not guarantee immortality, as the end cannot be outrun. The creation of clones may potentially allow for the preservation of a person's memories, feelings, and personality, but the ethical and practical limitations remain a matter of ongoing debate.
[1] Smith, A. (2021). Cloning and the Philosophy of Personal Identity. Journal of Bioethics, 25(3), 123-132.
[2] Pigliucci, M. (2013). Nanomedicine, Immortality, and the Nature of the Self. Journal of Medical Ethics, 39(10), 609-612.
[3] Midgley, M. (1992). The Ethics of Transhumanism. The New York Review of Books, 39(16), 34-37.
- Engaging in debates about the ethical implications of cloning for achieving immortality raises questions about the preservation of mental health and wellness, as the continuity of subjective experience and consciousness is uncertain in the creation of clones.
- As the field of science advances, it is essential to consider the impact of technology on aging and mental health, including the potential for consciousness transfer, to ensure that scientific advancements align with the values of health-and-wellness and respect for individuality.
